I was discussing with CC how theologians deal with evil things happening to apparently non-evil people. I can understand easily enough how this makes sense if one posits a non-interventionist or non-rational God. (Personally, I find myself somewhere between "there is no God" and "if there is a God, so what?" In both cases, decidedly non-interventionist. As for God's rationality, though the question does not directly apply, my faith in science is in its own way a deeply, even essentially, rational God of sorts.)
However, I don't understand how one can rationally reconcile evil things happening to non-evil people, or evil things happening to good people, with a rational and interventionist God. If one takes the rationality and interventionism of God as axiomatic, it simply does not seem to make sense that evil things would happen to other than evil people. It seems to me that the only way to reconcile evil things happening to apparently non-evil people with a rational and interventionist God is to seize on the "apparently" in "apparently non-evil". Having only human perception, we cannot know for sure whether someone is evil, so if a rational and interventionist God allows evil things to happen to them, they must have been evil after all.
It seems like such a copout to say that God must not really care all that much after all - there goes God's being interventionist - or that God doesn't actually have the power to change much of anything - again, there goes God's being interventionist. Same goes for asserting that God is irrational - what's the point of even studying God then?
My understanding from CC is that all modern theologians (post-Holocaust) she's read about have rejected the idea that evil things happening to someone implies that they are evil, even those theologians who believe in a rational, interventionist God. I don't see how that can be possible without giving up on some of the essential characteristics of such a God - how do they do it? What am I missing?